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DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY AS A COUNTER-TERRORISM TOOL: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN AND DUTCH LEGISLATION
TOM L. BOEKESTEIN

I. AT THE TIME OF WRITING, most major western countries are faced with a realistic
scenario of terrorist attacks, and even those countries who have not yet been successfully targeted
have increased their security efforts to prevent potential harm in the future. In addition to traditional
criminal law measures and extended surveillance, several states now include their laws on
nationality or citizenship in their counter-terrorism efforts.1 These countries have introduced and/or
expanded their rules on revocation of nationality. Deprivation of nationality as such is not a new
legal concept, however, but has always been accepted as being the flipside of the state’s
competence to convey nationality.2 The use of deprivation in the context of counterterrorism, in
contrast, is a rather recent invention that is somewhat reminiscent of the old practice of exiling
criminals. Today, states deprive terrorists and/or foreign fighters3 of their nationality in response
to certain actions that may or may not have been criminalized. The purpose is to prevent individuals
from exercising their right to return, as states are generally obliged to readmit their own citizens to
their territory and thus unable to deport them while they are nationals. Deprivation of nationality
as a counter-terrorism tool is thus to be placed on the borderline between an administrative sanction
and an act of criminal law punishment.4 Although the scope and underlying mechanisms of these
measures differ greatly between states, two main categories of such legislation will be
distinguished.
The majority of states resorting to deprivation of nationality as a counter-terrorism tool do
so in response to a criminal conviction, usually for a terrorist offence. The rationale is simple: a
subject convicted of a terrorist crime can consequently be expatriated and will be removed from
1

For the purposes of this paper, the words citizenship and nationality are used interchangeably.
L Van Waas, “Foreign Fighters and the Deprivation of Nationality: National Practices and International Law
Implications”, in A De Grutty, F Capone & C Paulussen eds, Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond
(The Hague: Springer, 2016), at 471-472.
3
The term ‘foreign fighter’ generally refers to individuals who have left their home countries to join terrorist
organizations abroad. These individuals are viewed as posing a significant risk once they return to their home country.
4
S Lavi, “Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Duties of Citizens and their Criminal Breach”,
(2011) 61 U Toronto LJ 783, at 784.
2
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the country, thereby becoming unable to commit new attacks within said country. Far less states
have resorted to more extensive deprivation, the paradigm example being certain Sections in the
British Nationality Act (BNA).5 Here, deprivation has been disconnected from a foregoing criminal
conviction and is thus more far-reaching. Yet the underlying rationale continues to be protection
through exclusion. While it is possible to categorize deprivation of nationality along these two
major lines, their implementation and application by various states differs widely. Actions that will
most certainly result in a loss of nationality in one country may not have any such consequence in
another. To highlight this new trend in nationality law and discuss the different developments in
the states that follow it, a comparative analysis of the relevant aspects of Dutch and Canadian
Citizenship Acts will be conducted. The scope of the analysis has been limited to these two
jurisdictions, as they currently seem to be undergoing strictly antithetical developments in this
field: Canada has, at the time of writing, repealed the sections of Bill C-24 which introduced the
possibility of revoking the citizenship of subject who had been convicted of a terrorist offence.6 In
contrast, the Netherlands introduced legislation similar to the Canadian Bill C-24 in 20107 which
was expanded in 2016.8 It also inured denationalization laws9 that forego criminal conviction in
March 2017.10 The Minister of Security and Justice gained discretionary power to revoke
citizenship of people who are deemed a threat against national security, circumventing criminal
law. These two countries have been selected because of the great legislative similarities at
beginning of 2017 and the great differences resulting from amendments adopted by both only six
months later. In addition to these initial similarities and diverging developments, the selection of
the two countries is also based on the fundamental differences in the way they address the foreign

5

United Kingdom, British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61.
Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd
Parl, 2017.
7
Rijkswet van 17 juni 2010, houdende wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap met betrekking tot
meervoudige nationaliteit en andere nationaliteitsrechtelijke kwesties, 2010, Stb. 2010, 242.
8
Rijkswet van 5 maart 2016, wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap ter verruiming van de mogelijkheden
voor het ontnemen van het Nederlanderschap bij terroristische misdrijven, 2016, Stb. 2016/121.
9
For the purposes of this paper, ‘denationalisation’, ‘revocation (of nationality)’, and ‘deprivation (of nationality)’ will
be used interchangeably.
10
Rijkswet van 10 februari 2017, wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap in verband met het intrekken van
het Nederlanderschap in het belang van de nationale veiligheid, 2017, Stb. 2017, 52; Article II of Besluit van 10
februari 2017, wijziging van het Besluit verkrijging en verlies Nederlanderschap met het oog op het vaststellen van de
elementen die betrokken worden bij de belangenafweging inzake een besluit omtrent intrekking van het
Nederlanderschap en tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de artikelen I en IB van de Rijkswet van
10 februari 2017 tot wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap in verband met het intrekken van het
Nederlanderschap in het belang van de nationale veiligheid, 2017, Stb. 2017, 52, published on 28 February 2017 in
Stb. 2017, 67.
6
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fighter threat. A comparative analysis therefore offers important insights into the function of
denationalization in different counter-terrorism strategies and its necessity and effectiveness.
Finally, while the Netherlands provide a classic example of the general international trend to resort
to nationality law as an anti-terrorism measure, the Canadian approach offers an alternative to this
that highlights the shortcomings of these laws in particular and offers different approach to counter
the threat posed by returning foreign fighters effectively.
This paper will compare the recent changes in Canadian and Dutch nationality law, taking
into account the respective lawmaker’s positions on legislation of both types as well as criticism
raised against these laws. It will be assessed how Canada and the Netherlands use such legislation
to counter the threat posed by returning foreign fighters. Before addressing Dutch and Canadian
law in more detail, this paper will classify the various types of legislation that exist in national
systems into two categories. In doing so, an overview of the rules on deprivation of nationality in
counter-terrorism currently in force in a wide range of western and non-western countries will be
provided. The purpose of this is not to provide an in-depth discussion of these laws, but rather to
showcase the different manifestations of both types of law and their widespread use, thereby
putting the recent legislative developments in Canada and the Netherlands into perspective. It will
also elaborate on the difficulties inherent in such categorization due to the fact that domestic
legislation on deprivation of nationality differs widely. After having sketched out the background,
this paper will analyze the relevant provisions of both Canadian and Dutch nationality law,
including a comparison of the current legislation and recent developments. The counter-terrorism
strategies of both countries, specifically with regard to foreign fighters, will also be discussed and
taken into consideration as it provides the backdrop against which the denationalization laws
operate. In sum, the general counter-terrorism context, the legislative background of the
denationalization measures as such, and the criticism directed at these laws will be used to explain
the functioning of these laws and the diverging developments in Dutch and Canadian nationality
law. Ultimately, this paper will reach a conclusion on the extent to which Dutch and Canadian laws
diverge in this regard and explain these developments in their respective contexts.
II. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY AS A COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURE
A. NEW USES FOR DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY
Recent changes in nationality law that respond to the growing threat of terrorist attacks show the
rise of new forms of legislation permitting deprivation. Before the recent changes, states had largely
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limited deprivation of nationality to the few cases where it had been fraudulently obtained and
refrained from extending its use into the national security context.11 In recent years, however, states
have (re)discovered old and new uses for deprivation in the context of counter-terrorism.12 Several
states have adopted laws that allow for deprivation of nationality on ever broader grounds for the
purpose of protecting national security and preventing terrorist attacks.13 In general, recently
adopted forms of this legislation can be classified into two types, which will be established below
and substantiated with a limited discussion of some examples from selected domestic legislation.
B. TWO TYPES OF LEGISLATION
The two types of legislation allowing for the denationalization of (suspected) terrorists can be
distinguished on the basis of the underlying requirements that trigger their application. The first
type can be referred to as reactive deprivation of nationality. Legislation of this type commonly
requires the individual to have been convicted of a terrorism offence defined in the state’s criminal
code: a paradigm example is Section 10(2)b of the pre-2017 Canadian Citizenship Act, which
requires a conviction for a ‘terrorism offence as defined in Section 2 of the Criminal Code’, before
citizenship can be revoked. The example clearly demonstrates the purpose of the legislation: by
revoking the nationality of an individual who has committed a terrorist offence, the affected state
can easily remove that individual from its territory, and effectively bar such individual from reentering, as well as from committing another offence.14 The legislation has preventive, deterring,
and punitive effects. Furthermore, it should be noted that the underlying offences do not necessarily
require the commission of an actual terrorist attack, as more and more states criminalize purely

Revocation of nationality in cases of fraud is a common practice, see GR De Groot and MP Vink., “A Comparative
Analysis of Regulations on Involuntary Loss of Nationality in the European Union” in SC Nunez and GR de Groot,
eds, European Citizenship at the Crossroads – The Role of the European Union on Loss and Acquisition of Nationality
(Oisterwijk: WLP, 2015), at 64-67; Van Waas (2016), supra note 2 at 470-471; in the UK, until 2006 fraud constituted
the only ground for revocation of nationality, see SD Wood, “No Going Home: An Analysis of U.S. and U.K.
Expatriation Laws as Applied to the Current Crisis in Iraq and Syria”, (2015-2016) 25 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs
229, at 243.
12
A Macklin and R Bauböck eds, “The Return of Banishment: Do the New Denationalization Policies Weaken
Citizenship?”, (2015) EUI Networking Papers RSCAS 2015/14, at 11; T Choudhury, “The Radicalization of
Citizenship Deprivation” (2016) 37:2 Critical Social Policy 1 at 2.
13
Paradigm examples for this are s 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 c. 61, ss 33-35 of the Australian Citizenship
Act 2007 as amended, C2016C00726, or s 10(2)b of the Citizenship Act 1985, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29; see also Van
Waas (2016), supra note 2 at 472; GR De Groot and MP Vink, EUDO Citizenship Policy Brief No. 3: Loss of
Citizenship at 3.
14
As nationals normally enjoy the right to remain within their country of nationality, as vested in article 12(4)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March
1976).
11

DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY
preparatory or supportive offences.15 Subtypes of reactive laws are manifold, and include inter alia
the following:
-

Requirements that do not or only vaguely specify the offence that must be committed.16

-

Requirements that the conviction of the terrorist offence be punishable or actually punished
with a minimum term of imprisonment.17

-

Requirements that include offences committed abroad provided that they would constitute a
terrorism offence if they had been committed within the territory of the state.18

-

Legal constructions that assume voluntary revocation of citizenship where an individual
performs certain criminal acts.19
Regardless of the specific form assumed by legislation of this type, it is always reactive:

some form of criminal conduct needs to be committed by the individual in response to which the
citizenship is then lost, usually by a separate administrative decision taken at ministerial level. All
of these subtypes are subject to indirect judicial review prior to the revocation. While the courts
will not scrutinize the administrative decision itself, they are nevertheless engaged in determining
whether the underlying offence and criminal conduct have actually been committed.
The second, rarer type of legislation will be termed proactive deprivation of nationality. In
contrast to its reactive counterpart, these laws do not require the commission of a specific criminal
offence; they bypass the criminal law system, as denationalization will be triggered by certain noncriminal acts.20 A terrorist attack must not necessarily have been committed, prepared, or aided. In
the current fight against terrorism, the most prominent form of conduct leading to the revocation
of nationality is the joining of a terrorist organization abroad, most often ISIS in Syria or Iraq. It
cannot be overstated that legislation permitting proactive denationalization imposes a very low
threshold; neither a criminal conviction, nor specific individual conduct contributing to the
commission of an actual terrorist attack is required. In doing so, the judiciary is sidestepped in the

15

See i.a. §129a and b Strafgesetzbuch, published 13 November 1998|3322, as amended by Article 1 G v. 4.11.2016 I
2460 (German Criminal Code); article 421 Wetboek van Strafrecht, BWBR0001854; Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11.
16
See as an example s 34(2)b(ii) jo. (5) ACA.
17
Canada requires the individual to be sentenced to at least five years of imprisonment (s10(1)b CCA).
18
Again, s 10(2)b of the CCA provides a paradigm example for this type of legislation.
19
Section 33AA ACA 2007; This type as also served as reasoning for the Canadian Bill C-24 discussed below, see the
position taken by the former Canadian Minister of foreign affairs Chris Alexander in House of Commons Debates, 41st
Parl, 2nd Sess, No 102 (12 June 2014) at 1900 (Hon Chris Alexander): “They [terrorists] will have, in effect, withdrawn
their allegiance to Canada by these very acts.”; see in addition Macklin and Bauböck (Eds.) (2015), supra note 12 at
13.
20
Van Waas (2016) supra note 2 at 473.
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process leading up to the revocation and will only be engaged if the withdrawal is later challenged.
At the time of writing, three subtypes of this form of legislation have been identified:
-

Legislation that requires that the conduct of the individual shows that he has joined a certain
organization that has been classified as being terrorist.21

-

Legislation under which citizenship can be revoked as soon as the individual acquires the
citizenship of, or a right of residence in, a country deemed to be affiliated with terrorist
organizations.22

-

Legislation that allows for the revocation of nationality where the competent Minister is
convinced that this is in the public interest.23
It is evident that proactive legislation, by its very nature, aims at the prevention of possible

future offences, rather than responding to offences that have already been committed. Its rationale
is as simple as it seems to be effective: individuals who have affiliated themselves with a terrorist
organization in a foreign country will be unable to commit offences in their home country if they
are barred from re-entering as a result of nationality revocation.24 Although the two types of
legislation enumerated above are fundamentally different in their operation, their aims are
remarkably similar. Nevertheless, proactive deprivation of nationality clearly is the more intrusive
measure, as it is purely preventive and not subject indirectly to judicial review prior to the
revocation. It allows for deprivation of nationality irrespective of whether or not the individual will
ever commit an attack.
C. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Having established the two different types of deprivation of nationality in counter-terrorism, an
overview over their manifestations will now be provided to flesh out this theoretical background.
Canada and the Netherlands will be discussed extensively below and have therefore been omitted
from the overview. Its purpose is not to provide an in-depth survey or analysis of the legislative

21

This is the requirement adopted in the recently adopted Dutch Amendment, which will be scrutinized more closely
in section IV of this paper; see also the recent Israeli amendment in this regard, Israel, Nationality (Amendment No.
13) Law 5777 of 6 March 2017, s 11(b)(2)(b), see also The Law Library of the US Congress, “Israel: Amendment
Authorizing Revocation of Israeli Nationality Passed” Library of Congress (23 March 2017) online:
<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-amendment-authorizing-revocation-of-israeli-nationalitypassed/> for a comment on this.
22
Israel, Nationality Law (Amendment No. 13) Law 5777 of 6 March 2017, s 11(b)2(c).
23
Paradigm examples for this are s 40(2) BNA and s 34(1)c and (2)c ACA; see also M Goldstein, “Expatriation of
Terrorists in the United Kingdom, United States, and France: Right or Wrong?” (2016) 25 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 259
at 268-9; Wood (2015-2016) supra note 11 at 244-5.
24
As nationals normally enjoy the right to remain within their country of nationality, as vested in Article 12(4) ICCPR.
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peculiarities of the eleven systems to be touched upon, but rather to provide examples of
implementations of reactive and proactive deprivation of nationality in practice. It will also touch
upon some grey areas, in particular laws that exhibit characteristics associated with both types of
legislation. The selected laws will be discussed in order of their extensiveness, starting with South
Africa as the country with the most far-reaching laws.
(i) South Africa
The South African provisions on deprivation of citizenship are a combination of the proactive sec.
40(2) British Nationality Act (BNA) discussed below and the recently abolished reactive sec. 10(2)
Canadian Citizenship Act (CCA).25 Adopting a dual approach, South African nationality can be
revoked where the Minister of Home Affairs is ‘satisfied that it is in the public interest’.26 This
resembles the approach taken by Great Britain, bringing with it the same critique. Section 8(2)(b)
South African Citizenship Act (SACA) does not specify any other requirements that must be met,
leaving the deprivation at the full discretion of the Minister. Additionally, South Africa also
recognizes reactive denationalization under Section 8(2)(a) SACA, which grants the Minister the
discretion to revoke the citizenship of an individual who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of at least twelve months in any country. Where the individual was convicted outside
South Africa, it is additionally required that the offence committed would also have constituted an
offence in South Africa. Interestingly, the application of Section 8(2)(a) is not restricted to terrorist
offences but can be applied to any conviction, including low-level crimes such as theft or
trespassing.27 Although more precisely and restrictively worded, Section 8(2)(a) might actually be
even broader in its application than its proactive counterpart. Arguably, denationalizing an
individual convicted of theft can hardly be justified in the public interest. Should the individual
have been sentenced to at least a year of imprisonment, however, deprivation of nationality is still
possible through Section 8(2)(a)). Consequently, South Africa has created a tight system of
proactive and reactive denationalization. Deprivation of citizenship is possible in response to all
but the pettiest offences and can also be deployed proactively long before a terrorist offence has
reached the preparation stage. The application of the two types of revocation is, however, slightly

25

The relevant sections of the CCA are discussed in Section III of this paper.
Section 8(2)(b) South African Citizenship Act 1995, no. 88 of 1995.
27
As an example, an individual convicted of theft in Germany (§242 German Criminal Code, punishable with up to
five years of imprisonment) could already be deprived of his South African citizenship.
26
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curbed by section 8(2), which restricts the applicability of the two powers to dual-nationals.28 This
ensures that deprivation of nationality does not lead to new cases of statelessness.
(ii) The United Kingdom
Any overview over deprivation of nationality would be incomplete if it were not to discuss the
relevant section of the BNA 1981, which is notorious for the wide degree of discretion given to the
minister. Section 40(2) of that Act states that denationalization is permitted where ‘that deprivation
is conducive to the public good.’ This amendment, added in 2006,29 can arguably be categorized
as proactive deprivation of nationality, although it can also be applied retroactively. Practically,
there are hardly any limitations to the Secretary’s discretion to exercise this power. Following the
insertion of section 40(4A) by the Immigration Act in 2014 the limitations have been reduced
further.30 While originally an individual could not be deprived of his citizenship if statelessness
were the consequences, this is now possible in a limited range of circumstances. Following the
amendment, naturalized mono-nationals may now be denationalized if their conduct is ‘seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of [the UK]’ and the Home Secretary has reasonable grounds to
believe that they can obtain another nationality. Not only does this section raise issues of
discrimination by only being applicable to naturalized UK nationals, it also permits rendering
foreign fighters stateless, at least temporarily. It does not require that another nationality be
obtained before the deprivation takes effect, nor does the Home Secretary have to ensure that
another nationality can actually be acquired. The seriousness of these deficiencies that actively
undermine the global effort to end statelessness cannot be understated. In light of the vagueness of
the UK’s laws on proactive deprivation, the great discretion that is given to the Minister, and the
limited protection against statelessness, scholars have rightfully placed Britain at the forefront of
states using denationalization as a counter-terrorist measure.31
(iii) Australia
Australian nationality law also contains a pendant to British approach.32 Interestingly, it also
includes additional provisions that can be categorized as reactive deprivation of nationality, as

28

Section 8(2) SACA.
Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act 2006.
30
Immigration Act 2014, s 66(1); the power had been introduced in response to Secretary of State for Home Department
v Al-Jedda [2013] UKSC 62, 9 October 2013, where deprivation of nationality had not been possible because it would
have let to statelessness.
31
Choudhury (2016) supra note 12 at 2-3; S Lavi, “Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United
Kingdom, United States, and Israel”, (2010) 13 New Crim L Rev 404 at 410-411.
32
Section 34(1)c, 34(2)c Australian Citizenship Act 2007 as amended, C2016C00726.
29
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citizenship may be revoked by ministerial decision where the individual has committed a serious
offence,33 and provisions on the implied renunciation of citizenship by persons who commit one
of the acts specified in Section 33AA (2) Australian Citizenship Act (ACA) 2007 where it is meant
to further a political, religious, or ideological cause, to intimidate the public, or to coerce the
government of a state or part therefor or influence it by intimidation.34 Renunciation under the latter
provision takes effect automatically and immediately.35 The nature of Section 33AA ACA 2007 is
less straightforwardly classifiable under the dualistic distinction outlined above, as it requires the
engagement in an act that is at least supportive to terrorism,36 but neither refers to criminal law
provisions nor requires a criminal conviction. Whether the provision can be classified as proactive
or reactive therefore depends on the applicable type of conduct specified in Section 33AA(2)(a-h)
ACA 2007: where the nationality is renounced as a consequence of e.g. ‘engaging in a terrorist
act’37 it is reactive, whereas renunciation following the ‘receiving [of] training connected with
preparation for, engagement in, or assistance in a terrorist act’38 can arguably be categorized as
proactive. Consequently, Australian nationality law relies on a dual approach and uses both
reactive and proactive deprivation of nationality.
(iv) Switzerland
Interestingly, Article 48 Swiss Citizenship Act corresponds to a large extend to Section 40(2) BNA.
The provision allows for revocation of the ‘Schweizer Bürgerrecht’ if the conduct of the individual
is seriously prejudicial to the interests or reputation of the state and the person in question holds at
least one other nationality, thereby effectively preventing statelessness. Nationality can be revoked
as soon as these cumulative criteria are met.39 The conduct requirement, arguably, is extremely
vague and open to extensive interpretation, especially as despite the age of the provision, it has

33

Section 34(2)b(ii) ACA 2007 (note that this provision only applies to those to whom citizenship has been conferred).
Section 33AA(1) jo. (2) ACA 2007; under subsection (3), it is assumed that the purpose requirement is met where
the individual is a member of a terrorist organization or acting under the instructions thereof; the acts include engaging
in international terrorist activities using explosive or lethal devices, engaging in a terrorist act, providing or receiving
training connected with preparation for, engagement in, or assistance in a terrorist act, directing the activities of a
terrorist organization, recruiting for a terrorist organization, financing terrorism, financing a terrorist, or engaging in
foreign incursions and recruitment.
35
Section 33AA(9) ACA 2007; see also Choudhury (2016) supra note 12 at 2.
36
The conduct listed in section 33ACA(2) ranges from the engagement in international terrorist activities (a) to the
financing of a terrorist (g).
37
Section 33AA(2)(b) ACA 2007.
38
Section 33AA(2)(c) ACA 2007.
39
Article 48 Bürgerrechtsgesetz.
34

32 THE TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW

[VOL 5]

never been applied in practice.40 Given the absence of information on the application of the
provision or the exact scope or severity of the conduct required to warrant denationalization, it
could already be triggered by remote conduct not contributing to the commission of an attack yet.
Limited guidance on this provision is provided by the handbook accompanying the law, which
states that it is intended to apply primarily in the context of war, or to war criminals and terrorists.41
As application to (returning) foreign fighters is neither explicitly intended nor prima facie
restricted, it remains to be seen whether the law will be utilized in the fight against foreign fighters.
(v) Austria
Deprivation under Austrian Nationality law is similar to, but less extensive than, the English and
Australian approach. Under §33(2) Austrian Citizenship Act, an individual voluntarily serving in
an organized armed group and participating in armed hostilities abroad for that group, is to be
deprived of his nationality.42 This is again an example of proactive deprivation of nationality, as (a
conviction for the) commission of a terrorist attack within the country is not required to trigger the
provision. On the one hand, actual participation in combat for the group is required, which clearly
goes far beyond the ‘conducive in the public good standard’ adopted in England and requires proof
that the prescribed conduct has actually been committed.43 On the other, §33(2) does not seem to
leave room for discretion. Rather, the individual will lose his nationality by ministerial decision.44
Interestingly, Austrian nationality law does not recognize reactive denationalization, neither
through a specific provision nor through the infamous ‘public good’ standard adopted in England.
Taking into account the ‘abroad’-requirement of §33(2), this creates a mechanism whereby an
individual committing a terrorist crime in Austria cannot, whereas an individual fighting for a
terrorist group abroad can, be expatriated.
(vi) Israel
Following an amendment passed in March 2017, Israel takes a proactive approach that differs from
the one adopted by the United Kingdom or Australia. Under the new law, acquisition of citizenship
of certain countries, or a right to residence in these countries, is deemed sufficient to establish a
breach of allegiance, which subsequently allows for the revocation of nationality independent of

Staatssekretariat für Migration SEM, “Handbuch Bürgerrecht”, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement
EJPD (27 September 2016) online: <https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/weisungenkreisschreiben/buergerrecht.html> Chapter 2 at 16.
41
Ibid.
42
Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 1985, BGBl. Nr. 311/1985.
43
§33(2) StbG.
44
§33(2) StbG clearly states that nationality ‘is to be revoked’ if the conditions specified therein are fulfilled.
40
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whether an actual threat is posed by the individual affected.45 In addition, actual residence in one
of the countries will result in the presumption that a right to residence has been obtained. 46 This
dimension shows some similarities with its Austrian counterpart, as both allow for
denationalization where the individual has left the country. On the one hand, while Austrian law
requires that the individual has joined an organized armed group, residence in a specific country
suffices for the revocation of Israeli nationality. On the other hand, the Israeli approach is more
restricted in its scope of application, as the states it covers are explicitly enumerated and strictly
limited.47
(vii) United Arab Emirates
Similarly to Belgium (see below), the UAE only deprives naturalized citizens of their nationality.48
Natural born citizens cannot be expatriated for criminal offences committed.49 Under Article 16(1)
UAE Nationality and Passport Act, the commission, or attempted commission, of any action
‘deemed dangerous for the security or safety of the country’ can trigger denationalization. Although
the Article applies to both attempts and commission regardless of a criminal conviction, it is less
difficult to classify under the proactive-reactive categorization forwarded in the preceding section
than it may seem at first sight. Regardless of whether the deprivation is triggered by commission
or attempt, it is retroactive, as the threat posed has already materialized itself in the individual’s
conduct and is no longer abstract. However, Article 16(1) does not provide a more detailed list, nor
does it refer to specific criminal law provisions, to specify which conduct exactly warrants
denationalization. The terminology of the provision can cover a wide range of actions and is open
to extensive interpretation. Its application is not necessarily restricted to terrorist activities, but it
could also be utilized against a wide range of political opponents. In light of the vagueness and
broad applicability of the measure, deprivation of nationality becomes difficult to foresee.
(viii) Belgium
Belgian nationality can also be revoked reactively: under Article 23/2 Belgian Nationality Act an
individual convicted of a terrorist offence as listed in Title I ter of the second book of the Belgian
Criminal Code can be deprived of his nationality as a consequence thereof.50 Notably, this only
45

Nationality Law (Amendment No. 13) Law 5777 of 6 March 2017, s 11(b)2(c).
Ibid.
47
The provision includes Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip.
48
Article 16 United Arab Emirates, Federal Law Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments thereof
(Nationality and Passport Act), Federal Law no. 17 for 1972.
49
Article 15 UAENPA.
50
Strafwetboek 1867, 1867-06-08/01; Wetboek van de Belgische Nationaliteit 1984, 1984-06-28/35.
46
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applies to individuals who have received Belgian Nationality by naturalization.51 Those who are
Belgian by birth cannot be deprived of their nationality, regardless of whether or not they possess
another nationality. Similar to its Australian counterpart, Article 23/2§1 allows for revocation on a
wide array of grounds including preparatory offences, for as long as a punishment of at least five
years of incarceration is imposed.52 At the time of writing, Belgian law does not include proactive
deprivation of nationality.
(ix) Malta
Revocation under the Maltese Citizenship Act (MCA) can only have retroactive effect against
naturalized Maltese Citizens.53 Under Section 14(2)(c), a naturalized Maltese Citizen may be
deprived of his citizenship if he has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of at least twelve months within seven years of becoming a citizen. This requirement
shows similarities to Section 8(2)(a) South African Citizenship Act as it applies to convictions in
any country. Furthermore, the nature of the crime is not specified, and revocation can thus respond
to any conviction, even regarding petty offences. In contrast to the South African provision,
however, the offence committed must not necessarily be recognized in Malta as well. In
combination with the low sentencing requirement this might be problematic where the sentence
has been imposed by a non-democratic regime. At the same time, the MCA includes a safeguard
provision, that is the inverse of proactive denationalization under the BNA, ACA, or SACA. As
revocation is only possible within seven years of obtaining Maltese citizenship, the provision can
be described as creating a period of probation. Under Section 14(3) MCA, an individual may not
be deprived of his nationality, unless the Minister54 is satisfied that the retention of nationality
would not be conducive to the public good. This is the flipside of the UK approach, as the public
good criterion is used as a safeguard against, rather than a ground for, deprivation of nationality.
(x) The United States
The United States is the first country in this brief overview in which denationalization is strongly
restricted. In the U.S., the Government’s powers to revoke citizenship have been greatly restricted
by the Supreme Court, which held revocation without consent of the individual by word or conduct
to be unconstitutional.55 At the time of writing, the United States has not deprived terrorists or
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individuals who support or join a terrorist organization of their citizenship.56 The standard adopted
for renunciation of citizenship by conduct is notably high, as it requires the individual to perform
one of the acts listed in Section 349 INA to ‘voluntarily’ perform those acts ‘with the intention of
relinquishing US nationality.’57 Ultimately, only legislation drafted along the lines of Section
33AA of the ACA 2007 could be adopted under U.S. law, as it establishes that a citizen performing
certain acts renounces his or her citizenship. The currently proposed ETA would introduce such
provisions, but it is highly questionable whether it will be passed by Congress. 58 According to
Spiro, it is doubtful whether engagement in hostilities against the U.S. in itself suffices to establish
intent to relinquish.59
(xi) Germany
Germany provides the final, and together with the United States, the most restrictive example in
this brief overview. Following the extensive abuse of denationalization by the NS-regime,
revocation of nationality is now seriously restricted and apart from a few exceptions, prohibited by
the German Basic Law: Article 16(1) GG prohibits the involuntary revocation of nationality by law
or decision.60 The German state may under no circumstances withdraw the nationality held by one
of its citizens, regardless of that individuals conduct. Reactive or proactive deprivation of
nationality as recognized in the states discussed above, is therefore prohibited by the German Basic
Law. However, German nationality can be lost under art. 16(1), even involuntarily, provided the
loss is provided for by law and does not result in statelessness. In this context, the distinction
between revocation and loss is pivotal. According to the BVerfG, the distinction is based on
whether the revocation disregards the individual’s justified reliance on the continuance of his
nationality.61 Justified reliance is absent, for example, where nationality has been fraudulently
obtained.62 German nationality can also be lost through voluntary conduct of the individual, e.g.
56
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the acquisition of a foreign nationality or service in foreign armed forces.63 The latter is explicitly
limited to other states. Joining a terrorist organization is thus not covered. In light of the
constitutional prohibition, it seems unlikely that denationalization will be used as a counterterrorism tool any time soon.
Despite the broad discretionary powers or automatic mechanisms that have been
introduced, most of the above provisions include an essential common feature: from a purely
legalistic perspective, all are only applicable to multi-nationals, ensuring that the revocation does
not render a person stateless.64 This degree of protection seems to be the strongest in Germany,
where the prevention of statelessness is a constitutional right. Regardless of criticism expressed
towards denationalization and the worrisome vagueness of the majority of provisions introducing
the deprivation of nationality as measure to counter terrorism, it must be acknowledged that a
minimum degree of protection against statelessness is provided. Given detrimental consequences
of statelessness for those affected, the importance of such protection must not be underestimated.65
However, there is also a downside to this. Due to this limitation, these laws must primarily be
applied to the largest communities of dual-nationals, which may in turn lead to indirect
discrimination. For example, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has raised
serious concerns that the recent amendments to the DNA indirectly discriminate against ethnic
Moroccans.66 The UAE Nationality and Passport and Section 40(4A) BNA contain worrying
exceptions to the general effort to avoid statelessness, as these laws provide none or only limited
safeguards to ensure new cases of statelessness are prevented. This is especially alarming since the
provisions of the Act here discussed only apply to naturalized citizens, who must give up any other
nationality they hold when obtaining UAE citizenship.67 Ergo, the measure is only applied to mononationals, who become stateless as a consequence, unless they are able to have their original
nationality restored.
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Country Reactive Deprivation of Nationality
SA
Recognized, sec. 8(2)(a) SACA.
Sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment
for a recognized offence in any country.
UK
Not recognized.

AU

Reactive Deprivation of Nationality
Recognized, sec. 8(2)(b) SACA.
Minister is satisfied that revocation is in
the public interest.
Recognized, sec. 40(2) BNA.
Minister is satisfied that revocation is
conducive to the public good.
Recognized, sec. 33AA ACA.
Citizenship is implicitly renounced by
acts specified in sec. 33AA(2)(c-h).
Recognized, sec. 34(1)(c), (2)(c) ACA.
Minister is satisfied that retention of
citizenship is contrary to public interest.

CH

Recognized, sec. 33AA ACA.
Citizenship is implicitly renounced by
acts specified in sec. 33AA(2)(a, b).
Recognized, sec. 34(2)(b)(ii) ACA.
Convicted of a serious offence: sentenced
to death or a serious prison sentence
before obtaining citizenship.
Not recognized.

AT

Not recognized.

IL

Not recognized.

BE

Recognized, art. 23/2 WBN.68
Conviction for an offence under section
Iter Book 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code.
Recognized, art. 16(1) UAENPA.69
Not recognized.
(Attempted) commission of any action
deemed dangerous for the security or
safety of the country
Recognized, sec. 14(2)(c) MCA.70
Not recognized.
Sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment
for an offence in any country; retention
must not be conducive to public good.
Declared unconstitutional by the USSC in Afroyim and Terrazas.
Citizenship must be explicitly or implicitly relinquished by the citizen.
Prohibited by constitution, art. 16(1) GG.
Nationality cannot be revoked by the state unless fraudulently obtained.

AE

MT

US
DE

Recognized, art. 48 BüG.
Conduct that is seriously prejudicial to
the interests or reputation of the state.
Recognized, §33(2) StbG.
Service in, or participation in hostilities
for, an organized armed group abroad.
Recognized, sec. 11(b)2(c) Law 5777.
Reception of the nationality of, or a right
to residence in, certain Arab countries.
Not recognized.

Table 1: Overview of expatriation in the selected countries discussed above71
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III. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY UNDER THE CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT
A. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CANADIAN
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY
Since 9/11, Canada has significantly increased its counter-terrorism efforts, particularly focusing
on criminal and immigration law measures to address new threats.72 The counter-terrorism
measures that were introduced by amendment to the Canadian Citizenship Act (CCA) in 2014 and
subsequently removed again in 2017 must therefore be analyzed in the context of Canada’s counterterrorism policy, under which a wide range of measures have been adopted. The four-dimensional
policy is based on the principles ‘prevent, detect, deny, respond’, and emphasizes that the highest
priority is prevention, not only of actual terrorist offences, but also of the recruitment and training
of new terrorist fighters.73 Its primary response to terrorism is criminal law. While this seems to
be an effective approach, its implementation has been subject to criticism. Forcese remarks that
many of the laws adopted to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities are not related to the 2012
policy and lack independent review for effectiveness. He points out that this will likely lead to the
adoption of measures that seem to increase anti-terrorism efforts but are in fact ineffective and do
not fit into the overall strategy.74
Many far-reaching changes were introduced by the Anti-Terrorism Acts of 2001 and 2015
and expanded the Country’s criminal law capacity to counter terrorism.75 At the time of writing,
the Canadian Criminal Code (CCC) contains a specific chapter on terrorism as well as a number
of additional provisions that together contain an excessive number of provisions criminalizing
specific conduct, but also defines ordinary offences as terrorist crimes where they are committed
in a specific context or for a certain purpose. These measures fall under the fourth fundamental
principle of the Country’s counter-terrorism strategy: to prosecute terrorism as a criminal offence.76
Following the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, part II.1 of the Criminal Code now contains an elaborate
but fragmented set of offences criminalizing different stages of terrorism offences. In light of this,
For a detailed overview over the development of Canadian anti-terrorism law see R Diab, “Canada”, in K Roach,
ed, Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law, (CUP, 2015), at 78 et seq. and K Roach, The 9/11 effect: comparative
counter-terrorism, (CUP 2011), at chapter 7.
73
C Forcese and K Roach, False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism, (Irwin Law Inc., 2015), at
110-111.
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these developments see Ibid particularly at 558 et seq.
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Government of Canada, Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2d ed (2013)
at 10.
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a comprehensive discussion of all relevant offences cannot possibly be conducted here. Rather, this
section will focus on the provisions that address the foreign fighter threat and are of relevance to
the discussion of proactive and reactive denationalization. As will be discussed more extensively
in the Sections on the Netherlands, foreign fighters pose a particular challenge to criminal law
centered approaches to terrorism. They can only be prosecuted for the offences that they commit
while abroad, such as the joining of a terrorist organization, if the territorial scope of application
of domestic criminal law has been extended accordingly. Furthermore, effective prosecution may
be de facto impossible until the suspect has returned.
Before turning to the most relevant sections of the Criminal Code in more detail, it should
be noted that terrorism crimes have extra-territorial effect. With regard to the requirements that
must be met for extra-territorial application, terrorist activities must be distinguished from specific
terrorism offences. While the latter are explicitly enumerated in a number of specific provisions,
terrorism activities include any act that is committed for ‘political, religious or ideological purpose,
objective or cause’.77 An additional category covers offences related to the financing of terrorism
activities.78 While those committing a terrorism offence can only be prosecuted if they hold
Canadian citizenship or the right to permanent residence, terrorist activities are prosecutable as
long as they are committed against Canadian citizens or the Government. 79 In addition to these
general offences, the CCC contains offences directed specifically at foreign fighters: under
Sections 83.181 and 83.191 CCC, leaving the Country to facilitate, or participate in, the activities
of a terrorist group or attempting to do so, is a separate criminal offence. The provisions cover any
form of participation or facilitation. The Criminal Code also criminalizes leaving the country to
commit any indictable offence for a terrorist organization.80 The Supreme Court has explicitly
permitted extraterritorial law enforcement, provided that it complies with Canada’s obligations
under international and human rights law.81
The broad range of general and specific terrorism offences outlined above is supplemented
by preventive detention. Under this highly controversial measure,82 terrorist suspects can be
77
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detained on the basis of suspicions for up to three days without criminal charge. Individuals can be
arrested by a peace officer without warrant on “reasonable grounds that the detention of the person
in custody is likely to prevent a terrorist activity” since the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act
2015.83 Furthermore, non-citizens can be detained indefinitely without warrant if they are
“inadmissible and […] a danger to the public”.84 It can be effected on the basis of mere suspicion
of association with a terrorist organization.85 Through security certificates, it is further possible to
detain individuals pending their deportation if they are somehow associated with terrorism or pose
a general threat to security in Canada, subject to review by a federal court.86 Appeal against this
decision is only possible if the judge determines that a “serious question of general importance is
involved”.87 The information on which the certificate is based is often classified and until the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Charkaoui were often not disclosed to the detainee.88 Following the
ruling, the measure was amended to allow for the disclosure of the evidence to special advocates.
Bill C-24, which will be discussed in the next section, was not officially a part of Canada’s
counter-terrorism strategy but was nevertheless closely associated with it. After all, its proponents
stressed the possibility of stripping convicted terrorists of their citizenship during the debate on the
reversion of the amendment.89 It introduced deprivation of nationality as an extra-criminal law
sanction and with it the deprivation of the right to return as guaranteed by Section 6 of the Charter.
As a consequence, it de facto created the power to deport dual-nationals convicted of a terrorism
offence. While the overall counter-terrorism strategy is centered around, and based primarily on,
criminal law, denationalization supplemented this approach by providing additional forms of
deterrence and punishment, as well as a means to prevent convicted terrorist from reoffending in
Canada, thus contributing to the ‘prevent’ and ‘response’ dimensions.
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B. BILL C-24: THE STRENGTHENING CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT
Under the pre-2014 Canadian Citizenship Act, revocation of nationality was only possible where
citizenship had been obtained through fraud in the first place.90 As noted, many states revoke
citizenship that has been granted erroneously. In Canada, the grounds for revocation of citizenship
were expanded with the entering into force of the Strengthening of Canadian Citizenship Act on
19 June 2014.91 Bill C-24 introduced wide changes to the entire CCA, but some of the most
prominent can be found in the provisions on deprivation of nationality.92 The amendments
introduced by clause 8 established eight new grounds for revocation, all centered around the
commission of certain acts against Canada. These grounds were exceptionally broad and
controversially had retroactive effect.93 For the purposes of this paper, Section 10(2)(b) CAA is
especially relevant, even though it was ultimately repealed when Bill C-6 (discussed below)
received royal assent on 19 June 2017. It will therefore be referred to as pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b)
CCA. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss the Section to be able to compare the development of
the use of nationality law under the Canadian Counter-terrorism strategy to the toughening of
similar laws in the Netherlands.
Pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA allowed for revocation on two different grounds, provided
that a sentence of at least five years of imprisonment had been imposed for the offence in question:
(1) the individual has been convicted of a terrorism offence as defined in Section 2 of the Canadian
Criminal Code, which covers inter alia preparatory offences and offences of aiding and abetting;
or (2) the individual has been convicted of an offence committed outside of Canada, that would be
covered by the definition in Section 2 Canadian Criminal Code if it had been committed within
Canada.94 The wording of the provision created a broad scope of applicability, particularly because
it enabled retroactive application.95 It provided the Minister with a broad degree of discretion to
deprive individuals of their nationality and remove them from the country.96 After all, the right to
See the Canadian Citizenship Act before the 19 June 2014 amendment; C Forcese, “A Tale of Two Citizenships:
Citizenship Revocation for ‘Traitors and Terrorists’” (2013-2014) 39 Queen's LJ 551 at 566-567.
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enter and remain in the country under Section 6 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘the
Charter’) only applies to Canadian citizens. After denationalization, the individual becomes a
foreign national rather than a permanent resident and consequently has no right to remain in Canada
but can be deported.
Nevertheless, some limitations on the power to revoke nationality had been put in place.
Clause 8 of Bill C-24 introduced safeguards to ensure that the newly introduced measures did not
render individuals stateless.97 The restrictions included in Section 10.4(1) ensured that revocation
on the grounds including Section 10(2)(b) did not violate ‘any international human rights
instrument regarding statelessness […].’ The strictness of this limitation was however mitigated by
the subsequent subsection. An individual who is to be denationalized but claims to fall within the
ambit of section 10.4(1) will have to prove on a balance of probabilities that he is not a citizen of
another country if the minister has reasonable grounds to believe that he is. In short, the onus of
proof could thus easily be shifted onto the individual who then had to disprove the assumption that
he or she held another country’s citizenship.98 The minister, on the other hand, was able to base the
revocation on the presumption, rather than the certainty, that the individual had claim to another
country’s citizenship.99
C. CRITIQUE
The brief description of the amendments introduced by the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship
Act has already hinted at some of the issues inherent in Bill C-24. Indeed, it was widely criticized
by different NGOs and associations. However, before their objections can be discussed, it is
necessary to briefly consider the issues raised by the adoption of the Bill in and of itself. After all,
it is not entirely clear what the objectives of the Bill were and how it fit into Canada’s overall
counter-terrorism strategy. According to the statements made by the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration during the discussion of Bill C-24, the measure was based on the perception that it
had become common practice in all other NATO states to denationalize disloyal citizens.100 This
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reasoning is not only weak, but also obviously flawed. The fact that other states adopt certain
measures does not necessarily guarantee the effectiveness of a measure nor show the need for it in
a specific country. Additionally, as has been shown in the survey in Section 2 of this paper,
Germany and the United States both strictly oppose depriving their nationals of their citizenship,
even where they have openly turned against the state. In light of this, it seems that the main purpose
of the amendment was to reflect the value of Canadian citizenship, strengthening it through
denationalization in cases of serious disloyalty or breaches of allegiance, such as the commission
of a terrorism offence.101 The introduction of this quasi-criminal law sanctioning mechanism seems
to have been the primary aim of the amendment, which was reiterated in the debates surrounding
the abolition of the measure.102 While this may be a valid reason, it does not fit the approach set
out by the 2012 strategy. After all, the strategy advocates the use of criminal law, not quasi-criminal
law sanctioning under administrative law, as the main tool to ‘respond’ to terrorist conduct. Worse
still, pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) weakened Canadian and global counter-terrorism efforts in general.
By denationalizing individuals and deporting them to the country of second nationality, the
measure risked that these individuals would commit terrorist offences abroad for which they could
not then be prosecuted in Canada. This would effectively have relocated the threat to another
country rather than addressed it for good. This issue has also been raised by the NGOs criticizing
the measure and will be addressed in the next section. The issue is nevertheless remedied to a
certain extend by the fact that the requirements for the extra-territorial application of Canadian
criminal law to terrorist activities differ from those required to prosecute a terrorism offence
committed abroad, as in the former case it suffices that the activity was directed against a
governmental facility or the Canadian Government.103
Returning to the issue of exporting the terrorist threat, a point of critique that is generally
applicable to all types of deprivation of nationality, the issue that denationalization does not resolve
the terrorist threat in and of itself will be addressed.104 Although the revoking state is, at least in
theory, no longer threatened by the individual within its own territory, the threat itself has not been
resolved. As denationalization is only possible where the individual possesses another nationality,
the country of the remaining citizenship will be forced to take in the individual, and with him the
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threat of an attack. Should a sufficient number of states adopt legislation of either type, this could
lead to a race for revocation105 and potentially result in a viscous circle in which states adopt ever
broader revocation provisions to be able to denationalize citizens before another state does so.106
Another set of problems inherent in Canada’s pre-2017 legislation was that Section 10
practically introduced a form of retroactive banishment limited to dual-nationals. This raised
several points of criticism at once. First, the fact that the punishment of banishment was
reintroduced.107 Even though the bill does not (re-)introduce banishment as a criminal law sanction,
the effects of the revocation were comparable. A more pressing, second, point is that the
denationalization could also have been used to prevent potential future offences. On the sole basis
of past conduct, individuals could have been denationalized to prevent them from reoffending.
Although numerous criminal law systems impose punishment for aiding, abetting, or preparatory
acts, the revocation was a purely administrative measure and not subject to the rules and standards
of protection of criminal procedure. Critics argued that future conduct should be addressed through
criminal law rather than administrative measures.108 Punishment should be imposed as a response
to conduct prohibited by criminal law and not through quasi-criminal law administrative measures,
especially not where they only seek to prevent distant harm that may never materialize. A final
point of critique that was raised in this regard addressed the dilemma of the measure only being
applicable to dual-nationals. On the one hand, the measure cannot apply to mono-nationals, as this
could render individuals stateless. However, including protection against statelessness while
maintaining the measure will necessarily place dual-citizens in a less favorable position than mononationals.109 It raised the serious issue of direct discrimination against dual-nationals110 and had the
potential to fuel stereotypes against certain parts of the population in which dual-nationality is
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especially common. Bill C-24 was heavily criticized for being discriminatory, creating two classes
of citizens, and placing certain groups of Canadians under general suspicion.111
The criticism raised against Bill C-24 does not end here, however. In addition to the issues
outlined above, the possibility if depriving individuals of their citizenship where they had been
convicted for certain offences abroad was also subject to critique. It highlighted the serious issues
that would arise where the conviction had occurred in a country that does not adhere to due process
and fair trial standards, or deliberately persecutes those opposing the local government for terrorism
offences.112 Another, final point of criticism was raised by UNICEF, which found that the
legislation may have severe, two-fold impact on children and juveniles. First, it was remarked that
Section 10(2) contained no restrictions regarding the age of those who could be denationalized.113
While this issue was slightly mitigated by the requirement of a criminal conviction and the fact that
Canadian criminal law only assigns responsibility to those above the age of 12, the issue
nevertheless continues to exist for juveniles above that age.114 Secondly, children whose parents
have their nationality revoked, will be either be forced to leave the country, or separated from their
families.115
Next to the shortcomings of pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b), the safeguards against statelessness
included in Section 10.4 were also flawed. Although the provision prohibits the revocation where
it would result in statelessness, it also places the onus on the individual, who will have to disprove
the minister’s initial findings that the individual will be able to obtain another nationality. This shift
contravenes the UNHCR’s findings that possession of a second nationality must always be
demonstrated by the party advancing the claim, here the Minister.116 Additionally, the construction
is disadvantageous to the individual, as the minister will have significantly better resources to
establish whether a second nationality could be obtained.
In summary, the rationale behind the introduction of the measure as well as its quality were
highly questionable. It is unclear why, taking into account the serious concerns and problems
outlined in the preceding paragraphs, there was need for an additional administrative sanction for
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those who have already been convicted of a terrorist offence in Canada, especially when
considering the broad scope of the relevant criminal law provisions and the general focus of
Canada’s anti-terrorism strategy.117
D. BILL C-6: REVERTING THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY BILL C-24
Following the Canadian elections in the fall of 2015, the new liberal government introduced Bill
C-6 on 25 February 2016.118 The amendment was adopted by the Canadian House of Commons
and passed by the Canadian Senate with amendments on 3 May 2017. It received Royal Assent on
19 June and subsequently entered into force.119 The amendment reverts many of the changes
introduced by the 2014 amendment. For the scope of this paper, clauses 3 and 5 on deprivation of
citizenship are particularly relevant. Bill C-6 made short work of the expatriation sections
previously included in the CCA. Clause 3 simply repealed Section 10(2) altogether, thereby
removing the possibility of denationalizing those convicted of terrorism offences. Section 10.4,
which provided insufficient and unfair protection against statelessness was abolished by clause 5
of the Bill C-6. In short and with regards to deprivation of citizenship, the CCA was reverted to its
pre-2014 status, making fraud the only ground on which citizenship may be revoked. 120 The new
amendment has been welcomed widely for its reversion of Bill C-24: by limiting revocation to
instances where citizenship has been obtained by fraud, the broad and heavily criticized grounds
for revocation in the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) have been removed.121 The reform has been praised
for reintroducing equality in citizenship by no longer subjecting dual- and mono-nationals to
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different standards, and removing the ‘two tiers’ of citizenship122 and for removing
denationalization as a form of punishment outside the realm of criminal law.123
IV. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY UNDER THE DUTCH NATIONALITY ACT
On 10 March 2016, the Netherlands amended the Dutch Nationality Act (DNA)124 to widen the
possibility of revoking nationality of those convicted of preparatory terrorist offences, similar to
Bill C-24.125 In addition to the 2016 amendment, the Netherlands adopted further reaching
legislation in 2017. The Act amending the DNA in relation to the revocation of nationality in the
interest of national security has been published in the official journal on 22 February 2017 126 and
entered into force on 1 March 2017, introducing proactive denationalization.127 Both Acts have
been adopted in the context of the 2014 action plan for an integral approach to jihadism,128 which
seeks to reduce the threats originating from jihadists by all means.129 Both amendments find their
policy basis in the fourth measure announced in the first section of the plan, which clearly stipulates
that Dutch nationality will be used as a means in the fight against terrorism, by making it revocable
with and without a previous conviction for a terrorist offence.130 The new measures are particularly
serious, as Dutch nationality that has been revoked under either of the two provisions cannot be
reinstated.131 Deviation from this rule is only possible under exceptional circumstances provided
that at least five years have passed since the denationalization.132
In discussing these legal developments in depth, the subsequent sections will first elaborate
on the counter-terrorism context within which these laws operate, following which the 2016 and
2017 amendments will be analyzed and classified according to the two types established above.,
before highlighting the problems inherent in the new legislation.
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A. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DUTCH COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
Before discussing the counter-terrorism measures recently inserted into the Dutch Nationality Act
to respond to the foreign fighter threat, it is necessary to discuss the range of other counter-terrorism
measures that have been enacted as part of the Country’s anti-terrorism strategy. While the primary
response of Dutch law is also centered around penal law, several non-criminal law measures have
also been adopted to prevent radicalization and de-radicalize foreign fighters who have returned to
the Netherlands. Under the name Exits, a facility intended to de-radicalize and re-socialize
extremists was created in 2015. It is directed at specific groups of radicalized individuals who
reside in the Netherlands. However, it does not extend to Dutch foreign fighters who succeeded in
leaving the Country and have not (yet) returned.133 The facility’s task is to support individuals who
voluntarily want to leave jihadism behind. Continuing to resemble a carrot-and-stick approach to
terrorism and foreign fighters in particular, the Dutch counter-terrorism strategy includes other
non-criminal law measures, such as blocking the financial means and support of foreign fighters
whilst simultaneously offering consular assistance to foreign fighters abroad who want to leave the
organization they had joined.134 This is a first indication of the bipartite approach that the
Netherlands have adopted: tackling the terrorist threat at home through criminal and non-criminal
law measures, while simultaneously striving to prevent radical foreign fighters from returning
home and continuing their fight within the Country.
As mentioned, the Dutch approach includes a strong criminal law framework to address the
foreign fighter problem as such, as well as the threats that are posed by their return. Given the great
range of offences that are potentially applicable, it must suffice to mention a few notable and
particularly relevant examples here. Under Article 83 Dutch Criminal Code (DCC) an extensive
list of ordinary crimes is deemed a terrorism offence where it is committed with the intention to
further a terrorist aim.135 Furthermore, specific terrorism offences such as joining a terrorist

133

Specifically, Exits is directed at active jihadists without the intention to leave the Netherlands, radicalized
individuals with the intention to leave the country to become foreign fighters, returning foreign fighters, those
suspected or convicted of a terrorist offence and detained in special terrorist sectors of a penitentiary, see The
Netherlands, Bill 34356 (R2064): Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap in verband met het intrekken
van het Nederlanderschap in het belang van de nationale veiligheid, nr. 6 ‘Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag’, 1
April 2016.
134
Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme, supra at note 128, measures 8, 9, and 12.
135
The wide range of offences includes murder (Article 289 DCC), obstructing a session of either chamber of
parliament by force or threat (Article 121 DCC), or the unlicensed acquisition of firearms or ammunition (Article 55(5)
jo. 9 Dutch Weapons and Ammunition Law).

DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY
organization have been included136 and the preparation of any offence subject to a term of
imprisonment of at least eight years is in itself a criminal offence.137 In addition to this general
doctrine of preparation, Article 134a DCC criminalizes a number of specific preparatory terrorism
offences. In addressing terrorism, Dutch criminal law emphasizes prevention by criminalizing
conduct that takes place before the commission can be attempted or completed. Importantly, these
offences have extraterritorial effect.138 Dutch nationals who commit a terrorism offence outside the
territory of the Netherlands will still be subject to Dutch criminal law and prosecuted accordingly.
However, the measures listed above were deemed insufficient and incapable of targeting
foreign fighters abroad in particular, despite the extensive territorial scope. In the parliamentary
debate on the 2017 amendment, the government highlighted the factual impossibility of applying
the above measures to foreign fighters before their return to the Netherlands. While Dutch criminal
law does not suffer from material shortcomings in this regard and is de jure applicable to foreign
fighters, the government has stressed that effective prosecution is de facto impossible.139 The
prosecution of an individual who has committed one of the offences outlined above is seriously
obstructed as arresting and detaining the individual is nearly impossible before the return. But
according to the Government, the return is exactly what must be prevented at all cost in light of the
serious threat posed by these individuals. In light of this approach, prosecution of terrorism
offences committed abroad is indeed not a viable option. Instead, foreign fighters are to be
denationalized whilst still abroad and declared persona non grata to prevent them from returning
to the Netherlands altogether.140 Nevertheless, it seems that criminal law has not entirely been
rejected in this context. In November 2016, an amendment to the DCC was discussed that sought
to criminalize the intentional presence in regions controlled by a terrorist organization without the
prior approval of the Minister of Security and Justice.141 Due to severe criticism from advisory
bodies and the Council of State, the proposal was not included in the amendment introduced into
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parliament in June 2017.142 Particularly, the Associations of Dutch Journalist and Judges had taken
serious issue with the proposed amendment.143
In line with the discussion of the Canadian approach, it should lastly be noted that Dutch
authorities hold the power to take those suspected of one of these terrorist offences into remand on
the basis of a judicial order thereto.144 This is not an equivalent to preventive detention under
Canadian law, however; reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorism offence will be prevented
do not suffice to detain an individual. The power to detain aliens is also greatly restricted in Dutch
law. While detention on grounds of national security is possible, its application is explicitly
restricted to cases where no less intrusive means are available and until the individual agrees to
deportation.145 The length of detention is also strictly limited and may usually not extend beyond
six months.146
In summary, the Netherlands have adopted a counter-terrorism strategy that addresses two
different types of threats very differently. On the one hand, criminal law measures and
rehabilitation efforts such as Exits address the internal terrorist threat posed by individuals who
reside within the country or have returned to the country. Criminal prosecution is possible long
before a concrete threat materializes, and individuals are supported in their efforts to leave jihadism
behind. On the other hand, the country adopts a strong stance against foreign fighters based on the
underlying premise that once an individual has succeeded in leaving the Netherlands to join a
terrorist organization, despite the strong internal efforts to prevent this, their return must be
prevented at all cost. The counter-terrorism measures under nationality law, that will be discussed
below, are thus not the only means that have been adopted to address the foreign fighter threat.
Rather, they are meant to fit into the existing approach and fill the gaps that have been identified
therein, particularly the risks posed by foreign fighters who intend to return from fighting abroad
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and the lack of effectiveness in the enforcement of criminal law extraterritorially. They contribute
to the second dimension of the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy in particular.
B. THE 2016 AMENDMENT: DENATIONALISING THOSE CONVICTED UNDER
ARTICLE 134(A) DUTCH CRIMINAL CODE
The most important change introduced by the 2016 amendment is the addition of Article 134a
Dutch Criminal Code to the grounds upon which nationality can be revoked under Article 14(2)(b)
DNA: the Minister of Justice and Security is granted the discretion to revoke the nationality of an
individual after that person has been convicted of an offence under 134a DCC.147 This provision
criminalizes inter alia the factual acquisition of, or mere intention to acquire, means for the
commission of a terrorist attack or the preparation of such an attack.148 The 2016 amendment is
clearly a measure of reactive revocation. In contrast to its Canadian counterpart, the amendment
itself does not introduce deprivation in response to a conviction for a terrorism offence, but rather
widens the range of offence that can trigger denationalization. While many terrorism offences had
already been included in Article 14(2)(b) DNA through Article 83 DCC since an amendment in
2010,149 the 2016 amendment extended the scope significantly by adding Article 134a DCC as a
ground for deprivation. The provision criminalizes the acquisition of information, means, or skills
for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence, as well as the attempt to do so. The scope of
denationalization is thereby extended to include a wide range of preparatory conduct, whereby its
preventive capabilities are significantly strengthened. This fits into the generally preventive
approach that is also reflected in Dutch criminal law as discussed briefly above. In summary, the
amendment enables the Minister to deprive a multi-national irreversibly convicted under one of the
provisions enumerated in Article 14(2), a decision that is to be based on the individuals’
circumstances and the threat they pose. Because the denationalization must be based on a
conviction, it is to some extend subject to indirect review by the courts who have to determine the
terrorist nature of the underlying offence. The application of Article 14(2) DNA is subject to
limitations that are similar to those of the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA, although the standards
of protection differ. Under Article 14(8) DNA, only multi-nationals can be deprived of their
nationality, as denationalizing mono-nationals would render them stateless. In accordance with
international law, this limitation does not apply where nationality is revoked that had been
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fraudulently acquired in the first place.150 However, the onus of proof is different from that under
the CCA. It is not for the person who is to be denationalized to prove that he would become
stateless; revocation is simply prohibited if it results in statelessness.
The 2016 amendment and the powers that it extends addresses the threat posed by those
who participate in terrorist training camps or attempt to do so.151 While the Netherlands had long
recognized the power to deprive individuals who had joined another states’ armed forces of their
nationality, this power does not extend to the forces of non-state actors.152 This lacuna was closed
by the 2016 amendment, as the grounds for denationalization now include convictions for
participating in training camps. It is aimed at the threat posed by IS and the foreign fighters that
join it in particular.153 In addition, the amendment communicates that the use of Dutch citizenship
to facilitate terrorism in any state is not acceptable, thereby also stressing the values that are
attributed to Dutch citizenship.154
While content and purpose of reactive deprivation under Dutch law are rather
straightforward, it must be acknowledged that the practical effectiveness of the measure may be
reduced in certain individual cases following the CJEU’s rulings in Ruiz Zambrano155 and CS. 156
In the former case, a Columbian national challenged the refusal of the Belgian authorities to grant
him a working permit, as this would force him to leave the Union altogether, taking his two children
with Belgian nationality with him.157 The CJEU held that member states are not allowed to adopt
measures depriving EU citizens of their fundamental rights under EU law.158 By leaving the EU
altogether, the children would have been unable to exercise e.g. their free movement rights, which
under the Ruiz Zambrano rule is unacceptable.159 Although this rule was originally unqualified,
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this has changed since CJEU’s ruling in CS v UK, where the Court, for the first time, established
limitations on the derived right. According to the CJEU, a derived right of residence may be denied
only the grounds of public policy and security as defined under EU law, 160 and requires an
individual assessment of the case, meaning that it may not be the automatic consequence of e.g. a
conviction.161 Following these rulings, EU law can curb the effectiveness of the 2016 amendment:
should the denationalized individual have a relative, a child for example, who is an EU national
and dependent on him, he may nevertheless enjoy a derived right of residence. Should the threat
posed by the individual be insufficiently serious to trigger the CS exception, the denationalization
would de facto be rendered meaningless.162 Thus, EU law imposes at least light restrictions on the
effectiveness of the 2016 amendment. The exact impact and scope of this limitation will however
remain unclear until the first cases on this matter are brought before the Dutch courts or the CJEU.
Nevertheless, should it ever prevent the expulsion of a convicted and denationalized terrorist, this
would be a significant blow to the overall effectiveness of the 2016 amendment.
Following the enactment of the 2016 amendment, Dutch and Canadian laws on deprivation
of nationality as a counter-terrorism means had become akin. Both allowed for reactive
denationalization on a similar set of grounds and had strong preventive notions. Neither required
the commission of an actual terrorist attack to be triggered, as the commission of preparatory
offences sufficed. The two approaches branched with the adoption of Bill C-6 and the 2017
amendment, which will now be discussed.
C. THE 2017 AMENDMENT: DENATIONALISING THOSE WHO JOIN A TERRORIST
ORGANISATION
Less than a year after the 2016 amendment had entered into force, the second amendment to the
DNA announced by the action plan became law.163 It had been submitted to the lower chamber of
the Dutch Parliament on 4 December 2015,164 and was ultimately adopted by the upper chamber
on 7 February 2017.165 As suggested by the name of the amendment, the Act allows for the
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revocation of nationality in the ‘interest of national security’. The amendment was deemed a
necessary response to the ineffectiveness and undesirability of extraterritorial enforcement of
Dutch criminal law against foreign fighters in particular. It addresses a lacuna in the Dutch counterterrorism policy, particularly with regard to foreign fighters who have succeeded in leaving the
country and not yet returned to the Netherlands. While the individuals could certainly be convicted
in absentia, the sentence could not be executed.166 This creates a lacuna, as the threat posed by
foreign fighters upon their return cannot be effectively addressed pre-emptively under the preamendment framework. Under the bipartite approach discussed above, the Netherlands is first and
foremost determined to prevent or hinder foreign fighters from returning to their home country due
to the extreme risk they are said to pose.167
The 2017 amendment seeks to close this gap in the pre-emptive efforts against foreign
fighters through nationality law. The Dutch minister of Justice and Security is granted the broad
discretionary power to revoke the nationality of individuals residing outside the Netherlands if their
conduct indicates that they have joined an organization listed as engaging in an internal or
international armed conflict and endangering national security.168 Whether the individual has
joined such an organization is established where:169 (1) based on the conduct of the individual, it
can be established beyond reasonable doubt that the individual supports the aims of the
organization and intends to join it, or (2) the individual carries out actions for, or to the benefit of,
the organization.
Together with their nationality, the individuals are also deprived of their right to return and
declared persona non grata to prevent their lawful return to the Netherlands. Although this does
not provide absolute protection against factual return, it is said to seriously obstruct it. The scope
of application of the measure is limited to dual-nationals under Article 14(8) DNA to prevent new
cases of stateless. In practice, the deprivation of Dutch nationality has been disconnected from
criminal law and is now possible before an attack or any other terrorism offence has been
committed, prepared, or even planned. Joining a terrorist organization under the above criteria in
and of itself warrants denationalization at the discretion of the minister. Thus, as of 1 March 2017,
the Netherlands also employs proactive deprivation of nationality as a counter-terrorism tool. The
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newly created power was first used in September 2017, when the Dutch Minister of Justice and
Security deprived four Dutch dual-nationals of their citizenship for the first time.170 At the time of
writing, cases that challenge the new law or a decision thereunder have not been reported. It
remains to be seen whether individuals who have been deprived of their nationality will challenge
the underlying decision in court. In light of the recent case of K2 v UK it seems highly likely that
this will be the case, however.171 In this case, a decision of the British Home Secretary depriving a
British dual national of his citizenship and forcing him to return to Sudan was challenged from
abroad. This shows that even deportation or residence abroad is not necessarily an obstacle to
challenging these decisions. In light of the British case, it seems to be only a question of time until
cases against a decision adopted under Article 14(4) DNA will be brought.172
Despite its purely proactive and very broad scope, the new Article 14(4) DNA is not free
from restrictions. As stated, it cannot be applied to mono-nationals as this would render them
stateless, nor to individuals under the age of sixteen.173 This restriction was absent from the original
proposal, but was added by the left wing of the lower chamber of the Dutch Parliament during the
final voting on the proposal.174 The authors of the amendment were concerned that the original
proposal itself did not limit the applicability of the law to a certain age, nor did it include such
protection indirectly through criminal law as had been the case with the 2016 amendment.175
Finally, it must be noted that the new Article 14(4) is a temporary measure. Article IA of the
amendment automatically removes subsection 4 from Article 14 after five years in March 2022 due
to the intrusiveness of the measure.176
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D. CRITIQUE
Much like their Canadian counterpart, both recent amendments in the Netherlands have attracted a
substantial amount criticism, most of which is directed at the more recent amendment. Although
the two laws differ in nature (reactive v proactive), most of the critique raised can be applied to
both acts and the amendments will therefore be addressed together.
A first point of criticism has already been addressed in Section 3.3 and been referred to as
the “race for revocation” or “export of the problem”. Clearly, neither of the Dutch amendments is
directed at resolving the threat posed by foreign fighters properly. Rather, both simply export the
problem to the country of the individual’s other nationality. This approach merely prevents harm
by hindering the individual in legally re-entering the country. It is however incapable of eliminating
the actual threat the individual poses. Additionally, where several states adopt such legislation, it
may lead to a “race for revocation” through which both countries of nationality seek to expatriate
the individual before the other. Such a race is most likely won by the state with the harshest laws
and the lowest standards of protection, neither of which is desirable from a human rights
perspective. Additionally, the laws will likely cause the individual remaining with the terrorist
organization longer and might even result in the creation of new terrorist organizations in the
countries of remaining nationality.177 The 2017 amendment in particular is based on short-sighted,
insufficient, and ineffective attempt to prevent the return of the foreign fighter in exchange for a
feeling of security. A second issue applicable to both amendments is that it remains unanswered
why the current criminal law measures are insufficient to deal with the problem, even despite the
alleged gaps in extra-territorial enforcement. Whilst penal sanctions are still to a limited extent part
of the 2016 amendment, they are disregarded entirely under the new law.178 Most notably, the
Dutch Council of State has uttered serious concerns in this regard, referring to the extensive
possibilities of imposing criminal law sanctions on individuals long before an actual attack has
been committed under the current DCC179 and questioning why these measures are deemed
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insufficient.180 Proactive deprivation of nationality prevents the individual from returning in the
first place and makes the extraterritorial application of Dutch Criminal law impossible. The
application of the wide range of available criminal law sanctions becomes impossible. Should the
foreign fighter nevertheless succeed in returning to the Netherlands, prosecution for the crimes
committed abroad would not be possible. After all, Dutch Criminal Law is only applicable to those
who commit terrorist offences abroad who are Dutch nationals.181 For these reasons, the Council
of State deemed the 2017 amendment to be of insufficient benefit to the existing approach.182
Furthermore, Dutch scholars have raised concerns that the measure in itself may be
considered a form of penal sanction (e.g. banishment), similarly to their Canadian colleagues.183
Although, the measure falls within the realm of administrative law, it is similar to a criminal law
punishment in nature, but can be imposed without the need to adhere to the standards and
safeguards of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, despite the intrusiveness measures and their
limited effectiveness, the most pressing problem they pose is that of discrimination. The problem
applies to the two Dutch amendments in a similar fashion as it does to the SCCA. Both Dutch
measures can only target multi-nationals, as application to mono-nationals is prohibited.184 The
issue is especially pressing with regard to the Dutch amendments. The list of terrorist organizations
whose members may be stripped of the nationality is highly very limited and specifically directed
at Islamist terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and ISIS.185 In light of research into the background
of foreign fighters that join these organizations in particular, it is clear that individuals of ethnic
Arab background are more likely to be targeted than other dual-nationals.186 Consequently, they
are at least implicitly targeted and indirectly discriminated against by the new amendments.187
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Legal scholars have stated that, in light of these three primary concerns, the deployment of
nationality law in against foreign fighters and terrorism by the Netherlands remains insufficiently
motivated, especially when considering the fact that both criminal law and the Dutch Passport Act
seem to provide proper, less intrusive, and better safeguarded measures to address the problem.188
Experts fear that the expatriation of foreign fighters will not only radicalize them further, but also
raise that counter-terrorism agencies will likely miss out on from gathering valuable information
from returnees.189
Despite the harsh criticism raised in legal doctrine, it must be noted that some of the issues
raised with regard to Bill C-24 are not, or only to a small degree, applicable to the two Dutch
amendments. Firstly, the Dutch 2016 amendment on reactive denationalization does not contain an
equivalent to deprivation of nationality following a conviction for certain offences in a foreign
country. Issues relating to the possible absence of fair trial standards, abuse of power, or
persecution of the political opposition, that have been raised in connection to Bill C-24 are thus not
applicable.190 Secondly, both Dutch amendments offer a certain degree of protection to minors.
Under the 2016 amendment, protection is afforded indirectly through the DCC and its age
restrictions on criminal responsibility.191 Under the 2017 amendment, direct protection is
guaranteed: the new Article 14(4) DNA only allows for expatriation of those above the age of
sixteen. Although it remains possible to revoke the nationality of youths under the age of majority,
a certain degree of protection is nevertheless afforded. Unfortunately, the second issue raised by
UNICEF in this regard relating to cases where parents are expatriated, and children thus forced to
leave the country or to be separated, are equally applicable in the Netherlands.192 However, these
concerns are counterbalanced where children hold EU citizenship, as this will grant an additional
degree of protection, and may even prohibit the Netherlands from expelling the parent at all.193
The final point of criticism directed at the SCCA addressed its insufficient standard of
protection against statelessness. The DNA affords more protection than its Canadian counterpart.
Whilst under Section 10.4 CCA it is for the individual to proof that he is not the citizen of a country
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of which the minister has reasonable grounds to believe he is, Article 14(8) DNA sets forth a stricter
standard: it simply states that expatriation is not possible where it would result in statelessness.
V. EXPLAINING THE ANTITHETICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADA AND THE
NETHERLANDS
The above analysis has shown that originally, both Canada and the Netherlands relied only on
reactive deprivation of nationality to strengthen their counter-terrorism efforts. Since 2017,
however, both countries are undergoing antithetical developments. Whereas the Canadian
legislature has adopted Bill C-6, which removes any form of denationalization as a means to
counter terrorism from the Canadian Citizenship Act, the Netherlands has strengthened its efforts
to utilize deprivation of nationality in fighting the threat posed by returning foreign fighters.
Comparing the two systems could thus not yield more antithetical results. Before the 2017
amendment, the possibility of depriving Dutch nationals of the citizenship was more restricted
compared to its Canadian pendant. This has changed fundamentally. Dutch and Canadian laws on
deprivation of nationality are now developing in opposite direction. In light of the above survey,
the developments in Canada seem to be unique. While not all of the countries discussed
denationalize foreign fighters or convicted terrorists, the abolition of such laws shortly after their
adoption clearly moves against the ongoing trend to extend such legislation. This raises the
question why Canada has moved away from denationalization, whereas similar laws have been
maintained and even extended in the Netherlands? In light of the debate that accompanied the
adoption of Bill C-6, it seemed that the primary reason was the perception that the old law had
created two classes of Canadians; mono-nationals whose citizenship was irrevocable and dualnationals whose was not.194 Furthermore, when viewing the old denationalization law in the context
of the overall counter-terrorism approach within which it operated, it is also clear that the measure
did not fit into it. Denationalization is difficult to reconcile with a strong emphasis on criminal law
and the prosecution of terrorism as an offence, because it is an administrative sanction operating
outside of the criminal courts. Furthermore, a criminal law approach implies and emphasis on
punishment and rehabilitation, which are difficult to reconcile with denationalization given that in
light of its exclusionary nature it has the potential to undermine both by simply removing the
individual from society and territory. This applies equally to the development in the Netherlands,
especially with regard to the 2017 amendment.
194
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In the above discussion, it has become clear that denationalization is an integral part of the
Dutch approach to counter the threat posed by foreign fighters, which targets the prevention of
their return in particular. As Dutch criminal legislation on terrorism is more limited than its
Canadian counterpart, especially with regard to extra-territorial application and preventive arrests,
the measure fits well into the Country’s overall carrot-and-stick-approach to foreign fights and the
different strategies that apply to foreign fighters who have and have not returned to the country. As
an essential part of this policy, the 2017 amendment closes the gap previously left by the factual
ineffectiveness of prosecuting foreign fighters for crimes committed abroad before their return to
the Netherlands. This approach is in stark contrast with the Canadian approach, which is almost
exclusively centered around criminal law, relies on a multitude of specific terrorism offences, and
defines ordinary crimes as terrorist activity where they are committed in a terrorist context. The
effectiveness of the Canadian approach against domestic terrorism and retuning foreign fighters
alike is further supplemented by the broad scope and low requirements for preventive detention.195
As discussed, this strategy views terrorism as a crime and addresses it accordingly. Especially in
the ‘respond’ dimension, there is thus hardly any room for non-criminal law measures. Arguably,
the disruptive effect of denationalization is much greater in the Canadian approach where the
prosecution of extra-territorial terrorism offences requires a link through nationality or residence.
While this is also true for the Netherlands, its decision to adopt differing approaches to domestic
terrorism and Dutch terrorists abroad circumvents most of these shortcomings. By focusing on the
prevention of the return all together, the prosecution of returnees becomes moot. It is thus not
surprising that the Netherlands have opted for an alternative approach to remedy the lacuna and
simply sidestep it. On the other hand, and in light of the Canada’s general approach, it is also no
surprise that Bill C-24 was reversed. The measure never fit into the counter-terrorism strategy to
begin with, nor was it originally intended to be directed at terrorism specifically. Rather, it was
later on viewed as a tool to punish terrorists and disrupt their activities.196 In light of this, the
changes introduced by Bill C-24 must be viewed as a misguided attempt to keep up with a
misperception of the approach adopted by other NATO countries. The Bill did not offer any
particular benefits to security whilst simultaneously creating two different classes of Canadian
citizenship and its many shortcomings led to the reversion of the amendment just three years later.
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In contrast, the developments in the Netherlands fit well into the overall strategy and the specific
effort of prevent terrorism as early as possible. In light of this and the prioritization of collective
security over individual rights and liberties, the introduction of proactive denationalization is
coherent with the overall strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The now largely reverted Bill C-24 was the Canadian counterpart to the Dutch 2016 Amendment,
both being measures of reactive deprivation of nationality. While similar functioning and effect,
the two measures differed in some respects. Denationalization under the pre-2017 section 10(2)(b)
CCA was broader in scope than the Dutch law, as convictions abroad could also trigger revocation.
Furthermore, the two laws allow for deprivation of nationality on different criminal law grounds.
Whilst under the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA any conviction carrying a sentence of more than
five years could trigger denationalization, the Dutch law lists the offences for which expatriation
is possible and explicitly refers to specific terrorism offences, albeit without a minimum term
requirement. A final major difference could be found when looking at the safeguards against
statelessness. Here, Dutch law seems to provide stronger protection as it does not, in contrast to the
pre-2017 CCA, create a complex system by shifting the onus of proof after reasonable grounds to
belief that another citizenship can be obtained have been established by the minister. Rather, the
Dutch law pragmatically states that deprivation of nationality is simply not possible where
statelessness would be the result.
The above discussion of the synergies and divergences between Canada and the
Netherland’s general approach to terrorism, as well as the use of denationalization specifically, has
revealed that the underlying strategy to address the foreign fighter threat of both countries also
differ and provide good explanations for the different developments. It has been demonstrated that
the pre-2017 Section 10(2)(b) CCA never sat well with the Canadian anti-terrorism strategy to
begin with. In light of the criminal-law centered approach with its extensive extra-territorial
application and preventive detention powers, the introduction of reactive denationalization was
neither necessary nor appropriate. In contrast, the use of reactive and proactive deprivation of
nationality fits well into the overall Dutch strategy that does not focus on criminal law exclusively
in its particularly harsh stance towards foreign fighters, seeking to prevent their return at all costs.
Ultimately, both developments can be explained by reference to their respective countries’
overall counter-terrorism strategies. However, the wide criticisms that have been raised with
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regards to both criminal and nationality law measures must not be neglected. Especially in light of
the serious concerns and objections that have been raised against reactive and proactive deprivation
of nationality, which ultimately contributed to the adoption of Bill C-6, the use of such measures
should be strongly opposed. Indeed, the Canadian counter-terrorism strategy demonstrates that
denationalization of (suspected) terrorists is neither necessary nor desirable. Therefore, this paper
suggests that the Netherlands follow the recent amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act and
repeal the 2017 amendment as soon as possible. If not, it is very well possible that the law is struck
down for violating EU law or the ECHR. While there are no cases on the matter yet, it is not
unlikely that a decision depriving an alleged foreign fighter of his nationality will be challenged in
the near future, particularly in light of K2 v the UK. However, this does not imply that the
Netherlands should introduce an excessively intrusive criminal law measure such as preventive
detention. Until the measure is struck down by a Court, it is very likely that the Dutch Government
will continue to insist on denationalization as a counter-terrorism measure. From a global
perspective, it even seems likely that these powers will be expanded.

